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1. Introduction 
An important but unanswered question in the literature on governmental accounting is 
whether changes in how items are reported on financial statements have real economic 
consequences. In a frictionless world, the reporting of an item on the municipalities’ financial 
statements should have no effect unless it provides new information. However, research on 
publicly traded corporations suggests that financial statement treatment can influence how 
managers operate the firm. For example, the recent move towards a new revenue recognition 
standard has led some firms to change their terms of sale to ensure comparability in reported 
revenue over time. Even though a significant literature in public economics has focused on the 
budgeting process, we suggest that municipal managers are potentially similarly affected by 
changes in financial reporting. More specifically, we suggest that the disclosure and recognition 
of a new obligation (asset) will increase the manager’s awareness of this obligation (asset), and 
encourage the manager to make operational changes that incorporate this information. 
Importantly, we suggest that this is the case even though there is in fact no new obligation or 
asset—rather, the obligation or asset has always existed, the only change is how it is disclosure 
and reported on the municipality’s financial statements. Understanding whether there are effects 
in the governmental setting is especially important given the recent increase in GASB 
pronouncements and the important role that GASB statements play in municipal debt markets. 
GASB 68 provides a unique setting to examine the effects of disclosure for local 
governments. The standard focuses on the reporting of pension obligations, which are an 
economically important item for many municipalities. More important, while this statement 
required the recognition and disclosure of the entities’ net pension deficit, it did not apply 
uniformly across all entities. In particular, municipalities that participate in shared plans with 
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their state disclosed nothing in their financial reports with respect to pension obligations prior to 
GASB 68. Rather, pension obligations associated with these entities were disclosed only at the 
state level, even though each individual municipality is ultimately responsible for the future 
funding of its obligation. In contrast, municipalities with agency-type (or self-administered) 
plans disclosed the net pension deficit pre-GASB 68 in the supplementary information in their 
annual reports. This difference in pre-GASB 68 reporting allows us to isolate the effect of 
financial statement disclosure by comparing the changes in several economic constructs for 
municipalities that participate in shared plans with those that participate in agency-type plans. 
We employ a difference-in-differences (DD) research design that compares economic 
outcomes for municipalities that participate in shared plans with those that participate in agency-
type plans. The economic outcomes we consider are broad measures of revenues, expenses and 
the number of employees. We analyze these variables because they broadly capture the economic 
behavior of the municipality. Conceptually, our use of municipalities with agency-type plans 
allows us to control for general macroeconomic trends in revenues, expenses, and number of 
employees. Our analyses use a broad sample of 502 unique municipalities from across 47 states, 
representing the full list of municipalities whose population is in excess of 100,000 or is one of 
the three largest municipalities in a particular state. Our data is primarily hand collected from 
each municipality’s annual audit report or comprehensive annual financial report. 
We find significant differences in how municipalities with shared plans respond to GASB 
68 relative to those with agency-type plans. More specifically, we find that those with shared 
plans have a differential reduction in salary expenses, welfare expenses and employee headcount. 
This effect is entirely driven by those entities recording a net pension liability. In fact, when we 
split our sample according to whether there is an asset or a liability recorded, we find 
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complementary results. In other words, for those municipalities where GASB 68 generated an 
asset, we observe an increase in expenses suggesting that the municipalities were behaving as if 
they had additional resources. In contrast, for those municipalities where GASB 68 generated a 
liability, we observe a decrease in expenses suggesting that the municipalities were behaving as 
if they had fewer resources. In addition, when we use a continuous measure of the net pension 
liability, we find that the expense reductions are greater for municipalities where the net pension 
liability recognized is greater. Collectively, these results provide strong evidence that the new 
disclosure and recognition requirements under GASB 68 had real effects on municipal 
operations. 
Next, we conduct some exploratory analyses to understand the mechanism that is driving 
the change in behavior. We suggest that the pressures on municipal managers to curtail expenses 
when faced with disclosing and recognizing the net pension liability could be driven by debt 
market forces. More specifically, credit rating agencies or debt market participants may 
encourage certain municipalities to increase fiscal responsibility in response to GASB 68. Under 
this explanation, we should see stronger effects for those municipalities that are active in debt 
markets and those municipalities that are larger. We conduct cross-sectional tests where we 
separate our sample into groups based on either debt market activity or own county revenue. For 
both tests, we find incremental effects for both active debt and high revenue municipalities, 
wherein these entities reduce expenses more than either inactive debt or low revenue 
municipalities. Collectively, these findings suggest that the effects we document are partially 
driven by debt market forces. 
 
2. Sample 
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Our analyses use financial statement data for a broad sample of local municipalities. Our 
sample consists of those municipalities that are included in the Census Bureau Survey of Annual 
Governments, and that either have a 2016 population in excess of 100,000 or are one of the three 
largest counties within a state. We require that the municipality be included in the Census Bureau 
Survey of Annual Governments because we use items from that data as outcome variables in our 
analyses.1 We exclude counties in Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont since 
they do not have county-level governments. 2  These steps provide an initial sample of 
approximately 516 counties across 46 states.  
We collect county-level financial statement data from either the Electronic Municipal 
Market Access database (EMMA) or the county’s website to supplement our sample.3 For each 
county in the sample, we hand-collect the following items for each of their defined benefit 
pension plans: the type of pension plan, the net pension liability, the covered payroll, and the 
actuarial and required pension plan contributions for the calendar years 2013 through 2016. 
Counties that participated in multi-employer state-sponsored pension plans (PMEPPs) were most 
directly affected by GASB 68 because they previously did not have to recognize or disclose any 
pension liabilities on their balance sheet or in their audit report. In contrast, counties that 
administered single employer pension plans, administered multi-employer pension plans, or 
participated in agent multi-employer plans were required to disclosure their pension obligation 
pre-GASB 68 in the supplemental reports included with their financial statements. We refer to 
these three alternative defined benefit pension plans as other pension plans (OPPs). In our hand-
collection process, we classify each pension plan that a county participated/administered and                                                              
1 The most recent financial reporting information is available for the 2016 fiscal year (county year-ends between 
July 1, 2015 and June 30, 2016). 
2 We also excluded the five boroughs on New York City since these counties did not have individual financial 
reports. 
3 In cases where we could not locate an annual audit report or a comprehensive annual financial report (CAFR) 
online, we contacted the county treasurer and requested an electronic copy. 
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aggregated the net pension liabilities of that plan as either PMEPPs or OPPs. We exclude 
fourteen counties that do not have defined benefit pension plans (i.e., counties with no pension 
plan or with a defined contribution plan), leaving us with a final sample of 502 counties.   
We next match our Census Bureau revenues and expenses and hand-collected pension plan 
information with local government employment and unemployment data from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, county population, business establishments, poverty rates, county-square 
footage data from the Census Bureau, and personal income data from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. Appendix A provides a comprehensive description of the source documentation for 
each variable utilized in our empirical analysis. Our sample comprises of 1,669 county-year 
observations after eliminating those observations for which there is an incomplete set of control 
variables or missing revenues.4     
 
3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows that approximately 66% of our sample have a least one PMEPP whereas 
53% have at least one OPP. Refining our sample requirements further shows that 47% of our 
sample exclusively employ PMEPPs, 34% use only OPPs, and the remainder have some 
combination of MEPPs and SEPPs. In dollar terms, the average county in our sample has an NPL 
equivalent to $270 per county resident, of which approximately half is attributable to PMEPPs 
(average NPL per Capita = 0.14). The average county in our sample generates approximately 
$686 million in revenues (untabulated). Focusing on revenues in which counties have some 
control over, we observe that their total tax revenues and fee revenues are $560 and $260 per 
resident in a given county. From an expense perspective, the average county in our sample incurs 
                                                             
4 Note that the sample size for our multivariate specifications vary depending on the subset of pension plans we are 
investigating, as well as the availability of certain financial statement line items from the CB survey data. 
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total expenses of approximately $600 million (untabulated). The average county incurs salary 
expenditures of $440 and welfare expenditures of $130 per county resident. The CB Census of 
Governments does not include local county employment. Therefore, we measure local 
employment using the total number of employees working in public administration in each 
county (which could be employed at the Local, State, or Federal level), which averages 3,200 
employees per county in our sample. In terms of county-level statistics, the average county has 
approximately 268,000 residents, 5,900 business establishments, unemployment rates of 6.4% 
and poverty rates of 14%. Approximately 40% of our sample counties generate annual expenses 
that exceed their revenues.  
 In Table 2 we provide differential comparisons between counties that only participate in 
PMEPPs (i.e., PMEPP Only Ind. =1) versus counties that only deploy OPPs (i.e., OPP Only Ind. 
= 1). We find that OPP Only counties incur larger NPLs per capita than PMEPP Only counties 
with $320 of NPLs per resident versus $250 NPLs per resident. Both types of pension plans are 
underfunded on average, with 96% of OPPs being underfunded versus 90% of PMEPPS being 
underfunded. Although revenues per capita are indistinguishable between our treatment and 
control groups, OPP Only counties incur higher salary and welfare expenses, have larger 
populations and more business establishments, and incur higher poverty and unemployment 
rates. These differences highlight the importance of controlling for the observable time varying-
county characteristics in our subsequent analysis.  
 
4. Research Design and Results 
4.1. Identification 
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We utilize the adoption of GASB 68 to examine the real effects of financial statement 
disclosure for local governments. While this statement required the recognition and disclosure of 
the entities’ net pension deficit, it did not apply uniformly across all entities. In particular, 
municipalities which participate in shared plans with their state (PMEPP) disclosed nothing in 
their financial reports with respect to pension liabilities prior to GASB 68. Rather, PMEPP’s 
only disclosed pension obligations at the state level, even though each individual municipality is 
ultimately responsible for the future funding obligation. In contrast, municipalities with agency-
type or self-administered plans (OPP) disclosed the net pension deficit pre-GASB 68 in the 
supplementary information in their annual reports. This difference in pre-GASB 68 reporting 
allows us to isolate the effect of financial statement disclosure by comparing the changes in 
several economic constructs for municipalities that participate in shared plans with those that 
participate in agency-type plans. 
More specifically, we employ a difference-in-differences (DD) research design that 
compare economic outcomes for municipalities with PMEPP versus OPP arrangements. The 
economic outcomes we consider are broad measures of revenues, expenses and the number of 
employees. We analyze these variables because they broadly capture the economic behavior of 
the municipality. Conceptually, our use of municipalities with OPP allows us to control for 
general macroeconomic trends in revenues, expenses, and number of employees. 
4.2. Multivariate analysis 
We begin by limiting the sample to counties whose PMEPPs and OPPs have positive 
NPLs and examine changes in different revenues, expenses, and employment items between 
counties with a PMEPP NPL to counties with an OPP NPL. 5  We estimate the following 
                                                             
5 Our results are qualitatively unchanged when we exclude counties with both PMEPP NPLs and OPP NPLs, which 
account to less than 20 percent of our sample.  
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regression:  
(𝑘𝑘𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +
𝛽𝛽4𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃_𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +
𝛽𝛽7𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽9𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜙𝜙𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  (1) 
where County_itemi,t is one of the following five items for county i in year t: (1) tax revenues per 
capita; (2) fee revenue per capita; (3) salary expense per capita; (4) welfare expenditures per 
capita; and (5) the natural log of government employees. In addition, we include county-level 
fixed effects to mitigate concerns regarding unobservable differences between our PMEPP and 
OPP counties, and cluster standard errors by county. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 present results for our revenue items, tax revenues per 
capita and fee revenue per capita, respectively. Focusing on Column (1), the coefficient on Post 
(0.009) shows that tax revenue marginally increases in the period after the NPL recognition 
requirement. This coefficient is consistent with different tax revenue items increasing over time 
(e.g., property tax revenue). We find that the coefficient on our variable of interest Post × 
PMEPP is not significantly different from zero. In column (2), in which the dependent variables 
is fee revenue per capita, we find that the coefficients on both the Post and Post × PMEPP are 
not significantly different from zero. Collectively, the results in Columns (1) and (2) suggest that 
NPL recognition for PMEPP does not affect counties’ decision to increase revenue. 
Columns (3) and (4) report results for the salary expense per capita and the welfare 
expenditure per capita, respectively. We find that the coefficient on Post in both columns is 
positive and significant, indicating that salaries and welfare expenditure increase over time. 
However, the significant and negative coefficient on Post × PMEPP indicates that these 
expenses decrease in PMEPP municipalities relative to OPP municipalities. In Column (5), 
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where the dependent variable is the log of the number of employees, we find a negative and 
significant coefficient on Post × PMEPP, indicating that PMEPP municipalities reduce 
headcount post-GASB 68 relative to OPP municipalities. We attribute this reduction to NPL 
recognition of PMEPP rather than NPL recognition of OPP. 
Next, we limit the sample to counties whose pension plans have a negative net pension 
liability (i.e., net pension assets, NPA) and examine changes in revenues, expenses, and number 
of employees between counties with PMEPP NPAs to counties with OPP NPAs. We then re-
estimate equation (1) for this sample. Table 4 reports the results of this regression. With respect 
to our variable of interest, we find a positive and significant coefficient only in Column (3), 
indicating that salary expense per capita goes up after the NPL recognition but only for counties 
with PMEPPs.6 This result provides for the effect of NPL recognition on expenses in counties 
with defined benefit pension plans who did not disclose NPL in their CAFR prior to GASB 68.  
Overall, the results in Table 3 and Table 4 provide strong evidence that the new 
disclosure and recognition requirements under GASB 68 had real effects on municipal 
operations. In particular, for those municipalities where GASB 68 generated an asset, we observe 
an increase in expenses suggesting that the municipalities were behaving as if they had additional 
resources. In contrast, for those municipalities where GASB 68 generated a liability, we observe 
a decrease in expenses suggesting that the municipalities were behaving as if they had fewer 
resources.  
In Table 5, we report the results from re-estimating equation (1) using a continuous measure 
of pension liability, PMEPP NPL per Capitai,t, in place of the PMEPP indicator and require 
county years to have a positive NPL to be included in the sample. Consistent with the results in                                                              
6 Our coefficient on Post × PMEPP NPA is no longer significant when we exclude counties with both MEPP and 
OPP. This might be due to small number of observations, given that the sample size drops to 67 county-years in 
some specifications. 
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Tables (3) and (4), we find a significant and negative coefficient on Post × PMEPP NPL per 
Capita in columns (3) and (4), providing evidence that counties reduce their salary expenses and 
welfare expenditures when they have to recognize NPLs after disclosing their pension 
obligations for the first time. In terms of economic significance, a standard deviation increase in 
a PMEPP NPL leads an approximate 12% (2%) decline in salary expenses (welfare 
expenditures) once net pension liabilities are disclosed and simultaneously recognized on 
municipalities financial statements through GASB 68.   
4.3. Cross-sectional analyses 
Next, we explore cross-sectional variations in the relationship between the GASB 68 rule 
change and county items to help ensure our results are attributable to NPL recognition of 
PMEPP. First, following prior literature that provides evidence of earnings management around 
equity offerings and debt issuance, we expect NPL recognition to have a greater effect on 
municipalities’ activities in counties that are more likely to issue debt (Teoh, Wang, and Rao, 
1998; Rangan, 1998; DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefiek, 2004; Liu, Ning, Davidson, 2010). 
Second, we consider the size of the municipality. Larger municipalities should have more 
flexibility in their budget, especially in terms of welfare expenses and employment.  
To test these cross-sectional conjectures, we calculate the average debt issuance (total 
revenue) per capita for each county i over our sample period. We then construct an indicator 
variable, High_Debti (High_Revenuei), which equals one if the county’s average debt issuance 
(total revenue) is above the sample median, and zero otherwise. We then limit the sample to 
counties whose pension plans have positive NPL and estimate the following regression: 
)     (2(𝑘𝑘𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ×
𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑉𝑉𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +
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𝛽𝛽7𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +
𝛽𝛽10𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶_𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽11𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜙𝜙𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
where Vari is either High_Debti or High_Revenuei. Here our coefficient of interest is 𝛽𝛽3, 
which captures the differential response to GASB 68 for debt issuing municipalities in our 
sample. Panels A and B of Table 6 report the results of this regression for High_Debti and 
High_Revenuei, respectively. As shown in Panel A, consistent with our results in the prior sub-
section, we find a negative and significant coefficient on Post × PMEPP in columns (3) and (4), 
confirming that salary expense and welfare expenditure decrease following the recognition of 
NPL. Focusing on column (3), we find a positive and significant coefficient on Post × 
High_Debt, suggesting that counties that issue more debt tend to spend some of these funds on 
salaries. With respect to our variable of interest, we find that the decline in salary expense in the 
post-recognition period is greater for High_Debt counties with PMEPP than other High_Debt 
counties.  
Moving to Panel B, we find similar results. Specifically, we find a positive and significant 
coefficient on Post × High_Revenue, in columns (1), (3), and (4), suggesting that counties that 
have more revenue, are both able to charge more in tax revenue but also tend spend some of 
these proceeds on salaries and welfare. This is consistent with richer municipalities both charge 
more from their residents but also provide more amenities and services than poorer 
municipalities. With respect to our variable of interest, we find a greater decline in salary and 
welfare expense in the post-recognition period for High_Revenue counties with PMEPP than 
other High_Revenue counties. Overall, the results of Table 6 provide further support the idea that 
the recognition of NPL for counties with PMEPP who did not have to disclose their NPL prior to 
GASB 68 has a real effect on counties. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table provides the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the paper. The sample 
includes county fiscal year-ends between June 30, 2013 through June 30, 2016. Variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
  
  N Q1 Mean Median Q3 σ 
PMEPP Ind. 1,669  0.00 0.66 1.00 1.00 0.47 
OPP Ind. 1,669  0.00 0.53 1.00 1.00 0.50 
PMEPP Only Ind. 1,669  0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 0.50 
OPP Only Ind. 1,669  0.00 0.34 0.00 1.00 0.47 
PMEPP & OPP Ind. 1,669  0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.40 
PMEPP NPA 1,669  0.00 0.53 1.00 1.00 0.50 
PMEPP NPL 1,669  0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.34 
OPP NPL 1,669  0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.50 
OPP NPA 1,669  0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.20 
PMEPP NPL per Capita 1,669  0.00 0.14 0.01 0.25 0.22 
NPL per Capita 1,669  0.05 0.27 0.16 0.35 0.36 
Post 1,669  0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00 0.49 
Tax Revenues per Capita 1,669  0.28 0.56 0.40 0.66 0.46 
Fee Revenue per Capita 1,660  0.08 0.26 0.14 0.26 0.40 
Salary Expenses per Capita 1,459  0.17 0.44 0.26 0.47 0.49 
Welfare Expenditures per Capita 1,504  0.01 0.13 0.06 0.20 0.16 
Ln(Govt. Employees) 1,577  7.46 8.09 7.94 8.57 0.85 
Hi Debt 1,669  0.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.50 
Hi Revenue 1,669  0.00 0.52 1.00 1.00 0.50 
Population 1,669  11.86 12.50 12.28 13.00 0.83 
Establishments 1,669  8.00 8.69 8.53 9.30 0.90 
Personal Income 1,669  10.51 10.66 10.64 10.78 0.22 
Unemployment Rate 1,669  5.00 6.44 6.10 7.40 2.05 
Density 1,669  195.85 635.88 342.91 666.20 863.22 
Poverty Rate 1,669  10.50 13.95 13.80 17.10 4.88 
Loss 1,669 0.00 0.40 0.00 1.00 0.49 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics by Plan Type 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the paper for counties with 
either only PMEPPs or OPPs. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The sample includes 
county fiscal year ends June 30, 2013 through June 30, 2016. We compare the means across 
PMEPP Only and OPP Only counties and cluster standard errors by county, and ***, **, and * 
signify statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 PMEPP Only Ind. = 1  OPP Only Ind. = 1     
Variable N Mean Median  N Mean Median   
PMEPP Only Ind. 781 1 1  561 0 0 N/A 
OPP Only Ind. 781 0 0  561 1 1 N/A 
PMEPP NPL 781 0.9 1  561 0.96 1 *** 
NPL per Capita 781 0.25 0.22  561 0.32 0.14 ** 
Post 781 0.38 0  561 0.4 0 ** 
Tax Revenues per Capita 781 0.51 0.41  561 0.47 0.32   
Fee Revenue per Capita 777 0.21 0.14  559 0.2 0.13   
Salary Expenses per Capita 607 0.31 0.25  535 0.37 0.22 * 
Welfare Expenditures per Capita 686 0.11 0.05  528 0.18 0.07 *** 
Ln(Govt. Employees) 754 7.98 7.85  531 8.25 8.1 *** 
Hi Debt  781 0.48 0  561 0.41 0   
Hi Revenue 781 0.44 0  561 0.49 0   
Population 781 12.35 12.18  561 12.74 12.55 *** 
Establishments 781 8.59 8.43  561 8.89 8.73 *** 
Personal Income 781 10.67 10.64  561 10.68 10.65   
Unemployment Rate 781 6 5.8  561 6.81 6.4 *** 
Density 781 563.54 296.92  561 776.26 396.56 ** 
Poverty Rate 781 13.34 13.2  561 14.33 14.2 * 
Loss 781 0.45 0  561 0.33 0 *** 
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Table 3 
Difference in Difference with Net Pension Liabilities 
 
This table examines the relation between net pension liability (NPL) recognition and different economic 
outcomes for counties. The sample includes county fiscal year ends June 30, 2013 through June 30, 2016 
and is limited to counties who either have PMEPP or OPP NPLs measured as of fiscal year 2015. The 
variable of interest is Post × PMEPP NPL. Post is an indicator equal to one after 2015. PMEPP NPL is 
an indicator equal to one for counties with a PMEPP NPL and 0 otherwise. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the impact of outliers. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. Each model includes county fixed effects. Below each coefficient value is the corresponding 
t-statistic computed based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the county level. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for two-tailed tests, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Tax Revenues 
per Capita 
Fee 
Revenue per 
Capita 
Salary 
Expenses per 
Capita 
Welfare 
Expenditures 
per Capita 
Ln(Govt. 
Employees) 
Post 0.009* 
(1.82) 
-0.001 
(-0.12) 
0.083*** 
(4.09) 
0.005** 
(2.25) 
0.003 
(0.94) 
Post × PMEPP NPL -0.001 
(-0.11) 
-0.009 
(-0.79) 
-0.131*** 
(-4.74) 
-0.008*** 
(-3.13) 
-0.007** 
(-2.02) 
Population 0.131 
(0.44) 
-0.505 
(-1.01) 
1.110 
(1.12) 
0.021 
(0.24) 
0.327* 
(1.86) 
Establishments 0.120 
(0.60) 
0.149 
(0.35) 
0.175 
(0.22) 
-0.035 
(-0.49) 
0.245* 
(1.93) 
Personal Income 0.024 
(0.38) 
0.110 
(0.95) 
0.627* 
(1.85) 
-0.001 
(-0.05) 
0.011 
(0.18) 
Unemployment Rate -0.009*** 
(-3.78) 
-0.008 
(-1.56) 
0.009 
(0.74) 
-0.000 
(-0.30) 
-0.001 
(-0.76) 
Density -0.000 
(-0.72) 
0.000* 
(1.69) 
-0.003*** 
(-3.29) 
-0.000 
(-0.93) 
0.000 
(0.34) 
Poverty Rate -0.002 
(-1.50) 
-0.002 
(-0.71) 
0.006 
(1.12) 
-0.001 
(-1.18) 
-0.001 
(-1.35) 
Loss -0.017*** 
(-2.82) 
-0.010* 
(-1.85) 
-0.031 
(-1.54) 
-0.000 
(-0.04) 
-0.000 
(-0.12) 
Adj. R-squared 0.991 0.934 0.859 0.987 0.999 
Observations 1,540 1,530 1,318 1,378 1,443 
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Table 4 
Difference in Difference with Net Pension Assets 
 
This table examines the relation between net pension assets (NPA) recognition and different economic 
outcomes for counties. The sample includes county fiscal year ends June 30, 2013 through June 30, 2016 
and is limited to counties who either have PMEPP or OPP net pension assets measured as of fiscal year 
2015. The variable of interest is Post X PMEPPNPA. Post is an indicator equal to one after 2015. PMEPP 
is an indicator equal to one for counties with a PMEPP NPA and zero otherwise. All continuous variables 
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the impact of outliers. All variables are defined 
in Appendix A. Each model includes county fixed effects. Below each coefficient value is the 
corresponding t-statistic computed based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the county level. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for two-tailed tests, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Tax Revenues 
per Capita 
Fee 
Revenue per 
Capita 
Salary 
Expenses per 
Capita 
Welfare 
Expenditures 
per Capita 
Ln(Govt. 
Employees) 
Post 0.008 
(0.54) 
-0.063 
(-1.26) 
-0.109 
(-1.11) 
0.002 
(0.37) 
0.009 
(0.97) 
Post × PMEPP NPA -0.001 
(-0.08) 
0.017 
(0.45) 
0.216** 
(2.29) 
-0.001 
(-0.26) 
0.006 
(0.56) 
Population 0.065 
(0.14) 
0.075 
(0.03) 
-1.942 
(-0.59) 
-0.181** 
(-2.54) 
0.201 
(0.79) 
Establishments -0.156 
(-0.36) 
-2.291 
(-0.95) 
-1.074 
(-0.29) 
0.028 
(0.33) 
0.237 
(0.88) 
Personal Income -0.034 
(-0.23) 
1.175 
(1.43) 
2.851* 
(1.82) 
0.043 
(1.18) 
-0.071 
(-0.99) 
Unemployment Rate -0.011** 
(-2.17) 
-0.018 
(-0.66) 
-0.023 
(-0.47) 
-0.003** 
(-2.42) 
0.001 
(0.46) 
Density 0.000 
(0.70) 
0.001 
(0.79) 
-0.003 
(-0.76) 
0.000 
(1.43) 
0.000 
(1.57) 
Poverty Rate -0.006* 
(-1.93) 
0.003 
(0.26) 
0.006 
(0.24) 
0.001 
(0.57) 
0.001 
(0.42) 
Loss -0.014 
(-0.76) 
-0.003 
(-0.12) 
-0.015 
(-0.17) 
0.003 
(1.49) 
-0.005 
(-1.03) 
Adj. R-squared 0.980 0.885 0.726 0.996 0.999 
Observations 265 262 228 237 253 
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Table 5 
Difference in Difference with continuous Net Pension Liability measure 
 
This table examines the relation between net pension liability recognition and different economic 
outcomes for counties. The sample includes county fiscal year ends June 30, 2013 through June 30, 2016 
and is limited to counties that have a PMEPP. The variable of interest is Post × PMEPP NPL per Capita. 
Post is an indicator equal to one after 2015. PMEPP NPL per Capita is the county’s net pension liability 
(in thousands) from their PMEPPs for fiscal years ending June 30, 2015 to May 31, 2016 scaled by the 
county’s population estimate for June 30, 2015. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles to mitigate the impact of outliers. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Each model 
includes county fixed effects. Below each coefficient value is the corresponding t-statistic computed based 
on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the county level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels for two-tailed tests, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Tax Revenues 
per Capita 
Fee Revenue 
per Capita 
Salary 
Expenses per 
Capita 
Welfare 
Expenditures 
per Capita 
Ln(Govt. 
Employees) 
Post 0.012* 
(1.70) 
0.008 
(0.74) 
0.047** 
(2.41) 
0.002 
(0.94) 
0.003 
(1.13) 
Post × PMEPP 
NPL per Capita 
-0.006 
(-0.37) 
-0.045 
(-1.43) 
-0.269*** 
(-3.79) 
-0.010*** 
(-2.66) 
-0.008 
(-1.17) 
Population -0.035 
(-0.11) 
-0.205 
(-0.32) 
0.734 
(0.68) 
0.107 
(1.02) 
0.332 
(1.64) 
Establishments 0.132 
(0.51) 
-0.245 
(-0.39) 
-0.738 
(-0.64) 
-0.176* 
(-1.74) 
0.227 
(1.49) 
Personal Income -0.052 
(-0.65) 
0.114 
(0.71) 
0.530 
(1.28) 
-0.009 
(-0.36) 
0.013 
(0.19) 
Unemployment Rate -0.011*** 
(-3.13) 
-0.006 
(-0.61) 
-0.016 
(-0.89) 
0.000 
(0.08) 
0.002 
(0.73) 
Density 0.000 
(0.35) 
0.000 
(0.79) 
-0.002* 
(-1.68) 
0.000 
(0.90) 
0.000 
(0.41) 
Poverty Rate -0.001 
(-0.81) 
-0.003 
(-0.75) 
0.007 
(0.90) 
-0.001 
(-0.88) 
-0.002 
(-1.21) 
Loss -0.017** 
(-2.09) 
-0.009 
(-1.27) 
-0.034 
(-1.16) 
-0.001 
(-0.36) 
0.002 
(0.58) 
Adj. R-squared 0.987 0.933 0.851 0.978 0.999 
Observations 1,108 1,100 880 969 1,042 
 
 
  
Table 6 
Cross-Section Variation in Effect of Net Pension Liability 
 
This table examines the cross-sectional variation in the relation between net pension liability recognition and different economic outcomes for 
counties. The sample includes county fiscal year ends June 30, 2013 through June 30, 2016 and is limited to counties who either have PMEPP or 
OPP net pension liabilities measured as of fiscal year 2015. In Panel A, the interaction of interest is Post × PMEPP × Hi Debt. Post is an indicator 
equal to one after 2015. PMEPP is an indicator equal to one for counties with a PMEPP NPL. Hi Debt is an indicator variable equal to one when a 
county’s average debt issuance per capita over our sample period is above the median county debt issuance per capita, and is equal to zero 
otherwise. In Panel B, the interaction of interest is Post × PMEPP × Hi Revenue. Hi Revenue is an indicator variable equal to 1 when a county’s 
total revenue per capita over our sample is above the median county total revenue per capita and is equal to zero otherwise. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the impact of outliers. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Each model 
includes county fixed effects. Below each coefficient value is the corresponding t-statistic computed based on standard errors adjusted for 
clustering at the county level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for two-tailed tests, respectively.  
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Table 6 (continued) 
 
Panel A: Cross Section Variation with Debt Issuance 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Tax Revenues 
per Capita 
Fee Revenue 
per Capita 
Salary Expenses 
per Capita 
Welfare Expenditures 
per Capita 
Ln(Govt. 
Employees) 
Post 0.000 
(0.10) 
-0.008 
(-0.90) 
0.018 
(0.77) 
0.005* 
(1.70) 
0.002 
(0.53) 
Post × Hi Debt × PMEPP NPL 0.003 
(0.21) 
-0.015 
(-0.65) 
-0.140** 
(-2.53) 
0.004 
(0.85) 
-0.003 
(-0.41) 
Post × Hi Debt 0.018** 
(2.25) 
0.014 
(0.60) 
0.139*** 
(2.64) 
0.001 
(0.27) 
0.002 
(0.34) 
Post × PMEPP NPL -0.002 
(-0.34) 
-0.001 
(-0.11) 
-0.063*** 
(-2.98) 
-0.010*** 
(-2.62) 
-0.006 
(-1.09) 
Population 0.089 
(0.31) 
-0.515 
(-1.03) 
0.968 
(1.00) 
0.013 
(0.16) 
0.326* 
(1.86) 
Establishments 0.127 
(0.65) 
0.157 
(0.37) 
0.257 
(0.33) 
-0.034 
(-0.48) 
0.247* 
(1.94) 
Personal Income 0.039 
(0.62) 
0.112 
(0.94) 
0.658* 
(1.89) 
0.000 
(0.02) 
0.011 
(0.17) 
Unemployment Rate -0.009*** 
(-3.72) 
-0.008 
(-1.58) 
0.010 
(0.85) 
-0.000 
(-0.30) 
-0.001 
(-0.76) 
Density -0.000 
(-1.17) 
0.000 
(1.46) 
-0.003*** 
(-3.62) 
-0.000 
(-1.09) 
0.000 
(0.34) 
Poverty Rate -0.002 
(-1.64) 
-0.002 
(-0.75) 
0.005 
(0.95) 
-0.001 
(-1.22) 
-0.001 
(-1.36) 
Loss -0.017*** 
(-2.75) 
-0.010* 
(-1.87) 
-0.031 
(-1.54) 
0.000 
(0.05) 
-0.000 
(-0.13) 
Adj. R-squared 0.991 0.934 0.862 0.987 0.999 
Observations 1,540 1,530 1,318 1,378 1,443 
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Table 6 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Cross Section Variation with County Size 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Tax Revenues 
per Capita 
Fee Revenue 
per Capita 
Salary Expenses 
per Capita 
Welfare Expenditures 
per Capita 
Ln(Govt. 
Employees) 
Post -0.002 
(-0.48) 
-0.013* 
(-1.80) 
0.007 
(0.49) 
-0.000 
(-0.15) 
-0.001 
(-0.27) 
Post × Hi Revenue × PMEPP NPL  0.005 
(0.46) 
-0.024 
(-1.20) 
-0.153*** 
(-3.20) 
-0.015*** 
(-3.15) 
-0.009 
(-1.23) 
Post × Hi Revenue 0.022*** 
(3.18) 
0.023 
(1.28) 
0.151*** 
(3.49) 
0.010*** 
(3.31) 
0.008 
(1.41) 
Post × PMEPP NPL -0.002 
(-0.34) 
0.005 
(1.02) 
-0.046*** 
(-3.80) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
-0.002 
(-0.45) 
Population 0.194 
(0.63) 
-0.528 
(-1.05) 
0.918 
(0.92) 
-0.002 
(-0.02) 
0.311* 
(1.78) 
Establishments 0.143 
(0.73) 
0.194 
(0.47) 
0.492 
(0.64) 
-0.014 
(-0.20) 
0.262** 
(2.04) 
Personal Income 0.015 
(0.24) 
0.110 
(0.95) 
0.633* 
(1.89) 
0.002 
(0.07) 
0.012 
(0.19) 
Unemployment Rate -0.008*** 
(-3.33) 
-0.007 
(-1.48) 
0.015 
(1.30) 
0.000 
(0.07) 
-0.001 
(-0.59) 
Density -0.000 
(-1.43) 
0.000 
(1.39) 
-0.003*** 
(-3.48) 
-0.000 
(-0.96) 
0.000 
(0.28) 
Poverty Rate -0.002* 
(-1.79) 
-0.002 
(-0.67) 
0.007 
(1.16) 
-0.000 
(-1.01) 
-0.001 
(-1.30) 
Loss -0.017*** 
(-2.83) 
-0.010* 
(-1.88) 
-0.033 
(-1.63) 
-0.000 
(-0.18) 
-0.000 
(-0.14) 
Adj. R-squared 0.991 0.934 0.862 0.987 0.999 
Observations 1,540 1,530 1,318 1,378 1,443 
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Appendix A 
Variable Definitions 
 
This appendix describes the construction of our variables used in this analysis, and we note the source 
documentation in parentheses.   
 
Pension Plan Variables:  
PMEPP Ind. An indicator variable equal to one if a county participates in a 
multi-employer pension plan (PMEPP), and zero otherwise (source: 
EMMA, County Websites). 
OPP Ind. An indicator variable equal to one if a county administers a single 
employer pension plan, administers a multi-employer pension plan, 
or participates in an agent plan (i.e., OPP), and zero otherwise 
(source: EMMA, County Websites). 
PMEPP Only Ind. An indicator variable equal to one if a county only has a PMEPP, 
and zero otherwise (source: EMMA, County Websites). 
OPP Only Ind. An indicator variable equal to one if a county only has an OPP, and 
zero otherwise (EMMA, County Websites). 
PMEPP and OPP Ind. An indicator variable equal to one if a county has both a PMEPP 
and an OPP, and zero otherwise (EMMA, County Websites). 
PMEPP NPL An indicator variable equal to one if a county PMEPPs report a net 
pension liability for fiscal years ending June 30, 2015 to May 31, 
2016, and zero otherwise (EMMA, County Websites). 
PMEPP NPA An indicator variable equal to one if a county PMEPPs report a 
negative net pension liability (i.e., net pension asset) for fiscal years 
ending June 30, 2015 to May 31, 2016, and zero otherwise 
(EMMA, County Websites). 
PMEPP NPL per Capita The county’s net pension liability (in thousands) from their 
PMEPPs for fiscal years ending June 30, 2015 to May 31, 2016 
scaled by the population estimate for June 30, 2015 (EMMA, 
County Websites, Census Bureau County Population Totals). 
NPL per Capita The county’s total pension liability (in thousands) from their 
pension plans for fiscal years ending June 30, 2015 to May 31, 2016 
scaled by the population estimate for June 30, 2015 (EMMA, 
County Websites, Census Bureau County Population Totals). 
Modifying Variables:  
Post An indicator variable equal to one for fiscal years ending after June 
30, 2015, and zero otherwise. 
High Debt  An indicator variable equal to one when a county’s average debt 
issuance per capita over our sample period is above the median 
county debt issuance per capita, and is equal to zero otherwise 
(Census Bureau, Annual Survey of State and Local Government 
Finances: Categories “29U”, “24T”, Census Bureau County 
Population Totals). 
Hi Revenue An indicator variable equal to 1 when a county’s total revenue per 
capita over our sample is above the median county total revenue per 
capita and is equal to zero otherwise (Census Bureau, Annual 
Survey of State and Local Government Finances: Categories “A”-
“D”, “T”, “X01”, “X05”, “X08”, “Y01”, “Y02”, “Y04”, Census 
Bureau County Population Totals). 
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Outcome Variables: 
Tax Revenues per Capita The tax revenues in dollars collected by the county scaled by the 
county population estimate (Census Bureau, Annual Survey of State 
and Local Government Finances: Category “T”, Census Bureau 
County Population Totals). 
Fee Revenue per Capita The charge revenues (e.g., utility fees, liquor license fees, insurance 
fees) in dollars collected by the county scaled by the county 
population estimate (Census Bureau, Annual Survey of State and 
Local Government Finances: Category “A”, Census Bureau County 
Population Totals). 
Salary Expenses per Capita Salary and wage expenses incurred by the county scaled by the 
county population estimate (Census Bureau, Annual Survey of State 
and Local Government Finances: Category “Z00”, Census Bureau 
County Population Totals). 
Welfare Expenses per Capita Welfare expenses incurred by the county scaled by the county 
population estimate (Census Bureau, Annual Survey of State and 
Local Government Finances: Categories “J67-J68”, “E74-E75”, 
“E77”, “F77”, “G77”, “E79”, “F79”, and “J79”, Census Bureau 
County Population Totals). 
Ln(Govt. Employees) The natural log of the number of full and part-time employees 
working in NAICS 92, Public Administration a county measured as 
of June 30th in each year (Bureau of Labor Statistics, QCEW). 
Control Variables:  
Population The natural log of the estimated county population as of June 30th in 
each county-year (Census Bureau County Population Totals). 
Establishments The natural log of the lagged number of business establishments in 
the prior year (Census Bureau, County Business Patterns). 
Personal_Income The natural log of the county income per capita for a county in the 
prior calendar year (Bureau of Economic Analysis). 
Unemployment_Rate The average unemployment rate in percentage terms for a county in 
the prior calendar year (Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area 
Unemployment). 
Density The county population estimate scaled by the area in square miles 
of land as of June 30th in each county-year (Census Bureau County 
Population Totals, 2010 Census Bureau Survey on Square Footage). 
Poverty_Rate The poverty rate as of June 30th of each county-year (Census 
Bureau, SAIPE). 
Loss An indicator equal to one when a county’s expenditures exceed 
their costs for a given county-year, and zero otherwise (Census 
Bureau, Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finances). 
 
 
 
